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This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market 
returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 
2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of 
non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different risk factors and firm characteristics. 
Family firms generate an annual abnormal return of 2.8% to 7.1%. Moreover, family firms 
potentially having more agency problems earn higher abnormal returns than other firms and 
markets participants are regularly positively surprised by the economic outcomes produced by 
these firms around earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that outside investors earn 
a premium for bearing the high expropriation risk of family firms. 
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Founding family ownership,  
stock market returns, and agency problems 
 
1. Introduction 
For over a decade, the impact of family ownership and control on the performance of 
publicly listed companies received extensive attention in the academic literature. This is 
important, since family firms represent a large fraction of listed firms worldwide (Carney and 
Child (2013); Faccio and Lang (2002); La Porta et al. (1998)). Most of this literature focuses 
on performance metrics related to profitability (return-on-assets, ROA) or valuation ratios 
(Tobin’s Q) (e.g., Anderson and Reeb (2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006)). However, the 
evidence on the stock market performance of these firms is more limited, although it is of prime 
importance for the minority shareholders of these firms and investors in general. Our paper fills 
this gap by proposing a detailed analysis of the stock returns of family-owned firms compared 
to the rest of the market. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss 
market, we find that family ownership has a beneficial impact, and that these firms deliver 
higher stock market returns than non-family ones. The outperformance of the former ranges 
between 2.8% and 7.1% per annum, depending on the way risk is adjusted. 
The stock returns of family-owned firms might have received little attention so far 
possibly due to the strong belief in market efficiency. Characteristics such as ownership 
structure, and particularly the identity of the controlling shareholder, if any, is public 
information that should be integrated into stock market prices, and there is no reason to believe 
that choosing stocks based on this information might lead to superior returns. However, recent 
literature shows that strategies using public information can offer superior returns on the stock 
market. For instance, Edmans (2011) shows that a strategy based on a publicly disclosed index 
of employee satisfaction (Forbes 100 best companies to work for) leads to positive abnormal 
returns. Moreover, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) document that choosing stock of 
companies with high CEO ownership also leads to significant outperformance. The common 
explanation here is that the market does not fully value these features, as they are difficult to 
appraise quantitatively. 
The positive impact of family ownership on stock returns could also be related to an 
improperly assessed effort of family members by market participants, since the concentration 
of ownership in family hands may both have positive and negative effects on economic 
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efficiency. Family ownership can thus have various implications on the agency problems in a 
corporation and, hence, on its profitability and perception by market participants. On one hand, 
family control reduces the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (agency 
problem I), as families tend to seek the long-term sustainability for their companies and, from 
their dominant position, can challenge any decision not in their interest. This behavior can be 
value creating for the company and its shareholders. On the other hand, the presence of a large 
shareholder generates conflicts of interest between minority and majority shareholders (agency 
problem II). The controlling shareholder can use its power to extract private benefits, which 
reduces company value. For family firms, these problems are not likely to materialize as pure 
wealth expropriation, since the own wealth of family members would be negatively impacted. 
However, agency problems may take the form of non-value maximizing decisions, because the 
family is pursuing objectives that increase its own utility (e.g., firm growth, reputation, or 
survival) and do not enhance shareholder value. Moreover, these firms can suffer from specific 
problems, such as family feuds or nepotism, which would also lead to firm value reduction. 
These two opposing effects of family control vary by company and depend on the different firm 
characteristics, such as the level of family control. Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) have documented a nonlinear relationship between firm 
performance and the stake of the largest shareholder. They show there is an incentive effect at 
lower levels of control, and that performance increases with family holdings. However, this 
relation changes to an entrenchment effect with negative consequences on performance at 
higher levels of control. For family firms, other factors, such as the generation the firm is at or 
the active involvement of the family in the management, play an important role on performance.  
This paper investigates the stock market performance of Swiss family firms from 
January 2003 to December 2013 for a sample of 195 companies listed on the SIX Swiss 
Exchange. The Swiss market represents an ideal laboratory for studying the relationship 
between family ownership and stock returns for two reasons. First, La Porta et al. (1999) 
document that, in most markets worldwide, ownership is concentrated, frequently in the hands 
of families, with investors being relatively poorly protected by law. In this respect, Switzerland 
is a representative market, as it is characterized by the presence of numerous family firms and 
low investor protection. Compared to the US, the levels of ownership by the largest 
blockholders are higher, which potentially makes agency problems between majority and 
minority shareholders more severe. Anderson and Reeb (2003) document an average holding 
of 17.88% of the voting rights for families in the US, while Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) report 
an average stake of 55% for families in Switzerland. In addition to the high control levels, 
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Switzerland ranks poorly in international comparisons of minority shareholder protection 
according to the studies of La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008). These Swiss market 
features facilitate the potential extraction of private benefits by the controlling shareholder. 
Second, this market has a relatively small number of listed firms. As emphasized in the 
literature,1 most commercial databases on ownership contain inaccuracies or are unable to 
identify correctly the ultimate owner of a firm. Therefore, hand collecting data on ownership 
structures from different sources overcomes this problem and allows documenting accurately 
the different aspects of ownership. This process is only possible with a reasonable number of 
firms, as is the case of the Swiss market. Another advantage of the limited number of firms is 
that it allows us to work with the entire population of listed firms. This contrasts with other 
markets, where the large number of listed firms forces researchers to work on subsamples, 
exposing the reported results to potential sample selection bias. 
The main results of this paper show that (1) family firms have higher stock returns than 
widely held firms and those with another blockholder; (2) considering a number of different 
risk factors, family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of risk-adjusted stock market 
returns; (3) the superior performance of family firms is associated with specific features of 
family firms, such such as the level of control, the generation, or the active involvement in 
management; (4) family firms have larger earnings surprises than other firms; (5) these earnings 
surprises translate into stronger market reactions to earnings announcements; and (6) the 
behavior around earnings announcement is related to family firm characteristics. Overall, our 
results show that family firms with potentially more agency problems have higher abnormal 
returns than other firms. We also find that investors appear to be regularly (positively) surprised 
by the economic outcomes of these firms around earnings announcements. This suggests that 
outside investors earn a premium for bearing the high expropriation risk of family firms. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, it adds to the literature 
on the link between ownership structure and stock market returns by proposing a detailed 
investigation of the impact of founding family ownership on stock market returns, an aspect 
that hitherto received limited attention.2 Besides documenting the difference in returns between 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Anderson and Lee (1997), Dlugosz et al. (2006), or Holderness (2009). 
2 Only few studies examined the stock market performance of family firms. For example, Corstjens et al. (2006) 
analyze large firms from the French, UK, German, and US markets, and find positive abnormal returns for family 
firms on the French market. Cella (2009) considers a sample of large firms from eight European countries, and 
documents that family firms from these countries earn significant positive abnormal returns. Fahlenbrach (2009) 
examines the performance of a subsample of family firms—those run by a founder-CEO in the US—finding that 
these firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2013) find that, for a sample 
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firms with different types of controlling shareholders, this paper details the reasons explaining 
the outperformance of family firms. We find that abnormal performance is associated with 
features usually indicating the presence of potential agency problems. Our interpretation of the 
results is that market participants are unable to correctly assess the performance of family firms 
because of the ambiguous effects of family presence on performance, and that the abnormal 
returns of these firms are a reward for bearing the risk of potential expropriation. Second, this 
paper contributes to the growing finance literature on family firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is one of the first to investigate the stock market returns of such firms and relate 
them to features known to have an impact on profitability and valuation. The paper is also one 
of the first to provide a detailed explanation for the abnormal returns of these firms, also 
showing that the presence of potential agency problems in family firms plays a very important 
role in stock pricing. Finally, our study contributes to the growing literature at the intersection 
of corporate finance and asset pricing, showing the existence of firm features not properly 
assessed by the market, which generate abnormal returns for investors. It shows that, under 
certain circumstances, the market might not integrate efficiently some publicly available 
information such as the ownership structure of a company into stock prices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Swiss 
institutional setting. Section 3 presents the data and variables used in the analysis and provides 
descriptive statistics for the sample. Section 4 analyzes the stock market performance of family 
firms, while section 5 provides an additional analysis of returns related to specific 
characteristics of family firms. Section 6 investigates how the market perceives family firms’ 
earnings announcement. Section 7 summarizes the major findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Swiss institutional setting 
The Swiss stock market is one of the largest stock markets worldwide. At the end of 
2015, it ranked 10th in terms of market capitalization (World Federation of Exchanges (2016)). 
Despite its size, the number of publicly listed firms is relatively small, as only 250 companies 
are traded on this market. The ownership structure of Swiss firms is typical for continental 
Europe as the majority have a concentrated ownership. For instance, Faccio and Lang (2002) 
report that, in 1995, 28% of companies were widely held, while 48% of firms are family-owned 
and 24% have a non-family blockholder. Moreover, they report that controlling shareholders 
                                                          
of Portuguese companies, family firms outperform others. However, this body of literature does not find 
explanations for the stock market performance of family firms. 
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essentially employ dual-class shares to increase their control over the company, as these are 
unrestricted by Swiss law. The authors report that 51% of firms use multiple share classes, 
while 10% resort to pyramidal structures and none to cross-holdings.  
In terms of corporate governance characteristics, Switzerland belongs to the German-
origin civil law countries according to La Porta et al. (1998), which tend to have poor investor 
protection. This is illustrated by Switzerland ranking poorly both in terms of anti-director rights 
index (La Porta et al. (1998)) and the anti-self-dealing index proposed by Djankov et al. (2008). 
It also has a nearly non-existent but slowly evolving market for corporate control (Lowinski et 
al. (2004)). These observations indicate that, on this market, controlling shareholders such as 
families have significant freedom. As such, agency problems between majority and minority 
shareholders can potentially be severe, since controlling shareholders can extract private 
benefits more easily than in other countries. However, improvements in investor protection 
have been recently observed. In 2002, Switzerland adopted a code of best practices for corporate 
governance. This led to significant changes in corporate governance practices. An example is 
the fact that numerous firms abandoned their dual-class share structure since. Finally, in 2013, 
the Swiss citizens voted a very constraining law to limit abuses on executive compensation.  
A recent example3 illustrates how the risk of expropriation associated with investment 
in family firms can materialize for minority shareholders in this setting. Sika AG is a medium-
sized company in the chemical specialties sector. The company was founded in 1910 by K. 
Winkler. He was then joined by his son-in-law, F. Schenker, and both developed the company 
over the years. The descendants of the two founders, the Schenker-Winkler family, then 
controlled the firm through the SWH holding company. With the use of dual-class shares, they 
held 16% of capital and 52% of voting rights. In December 2014, the SWH holding announced 
its intention to sell its complete stake to the French company Saint-Gobain, as the group of 
descendants had diverging interests and were not willing to keep the company anymore. The 
price Saint-Gobain agreed to pay to SWH holding for their shares included a premium of 80% 
over the current market price. Other minority shareholders could not benefit from this offer and 
were at risk with this change of control, as there were no guarantees for the future of Sika since 
Saint-Gobain is its direct competitor in many sectors. Following this announcement, the stock 
price dropped by more than 20%, directly affecting the wealth of minority shareholders. Sika’s 
example highlights the potential dangers for the shareholders of family firms in Switzerland, a 
country where investor protection is relatively weak. 
                                                          




3. Data and variables 
The empirical analysis is performed on a dataset of 195 companies listed on the SIX 
Swiss Exchange from January 2003 to December 2013. The final sample contains 19,928 firm-
month observations on the entire population of Swiss non-financial listed firms over the 
analyzed period. Different sources are used to build this database as follows. 
Ownership data are collected by hand, and include information on all non-financial 
companies belonging to the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), that is, detailed information on the 
ownership structure of the firms.4 Particularly, we have information on the identity of the three 
largest shareholders holding more than 3% of voting rights in every company (if any). When 
the shareholder is a company, we further search for the ultimate owner as to determine the exact 
type of shareholder (e.g., the Schenker-Winkler family behind the SWH holding company). We 
also identify the proportions of voting and cash-flow rights held by each large shareholder. 
Ownership data are observed on a yearly basis and recorded at the end of each year.  
Data are collected from the annual reports of companies, as well as from Swiss stock 
guides, newspaper articles, firm homepages, or the commercial register when needed. We 
follow the standard practice in the literature, and when the largest shareholder has a stake of the 
voting rights larger than the 20% threshold, we consider the firm is controlled by a majority 
shareholder (Faccio and Lang (2002)). We classify the companies by type of owner as follows: 
family, widely held, state, private investor,5 owned by another widely held corporation, owned 
by another widely held financial firms, and miscellaneous. For each largest shareholder of a 
firm, we compute the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights as the ratio between the 
proportions of voting and cash-flow rights held by this shareholder. In Switzerland, this 
difference is mainly due to the use of dual-class shares. When a company does not have a 
shareholder holding more than 20% of the voting rights, we classify it as a widely held firm. 
For these firms, we also compute the wedge for the largest shareholder even if he holds less 
than 20% of voting rights. 
                                                          
4 The database of ownership structure for 2003–2010 originates from the work of Isakov and Weisskopf (2014). 
We have extended their database and collected additional information for 2011–2013. 
5 We follow Andres (2008) and Isakov and Weisskopf (2014), establishing a specific category of controlling 
shareholder named private investor. A private investor is defined as one or more individuals that have neither 
founded the company nor shaped it in a substantial way over time. The motivations and values of a private investor 
strongly differ from those of a founding family. Typically, there are private investors who target making a quick 
profit and then leaving. Private investors also differ from other non-family blockholders in being more likely to 
reduce agency problems I (more incentives to control managers), but are more prone to agency problem II (more 
incentives to extract private benefits). Typically, firms with this type of controlling shareholder are considered 
family firms in a large proportion of the literature, which might lead to biased results. 
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We also collect additional information specific to family firms. We first distinguish 
between firms at the founder or at the descendant stage. When the founder is not active in the 
company or is not a shareholder and the firm is owned by his heirs, we consider the firm to be 
at a descendant stage. We then determine if family members have an active role in its 
management (as CEO and/or Chairman of the Board), and then distinguish between firms where 
the family is active or a passive owner of shares without direct management implication. 
Market data on the monthly stock returns of each company are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters’ Datastream. Returns are computed as total returns and include the dividend 
distribution. Besides returns, we also need a series of variables to quantify the different firm 
characteristics, as well as the earnings announcements, for the empirical analyses. These are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, Worldscope, and FactSet. A detailed description 
of the different variables and their sources is found in the Appendix. 
Table 1 presents the sample composition according to different types of controlling 
shareholders. These statistics are provided for the entire sample period (column 1). We also 
compute them for the first (column 2), middle (column 3), and last year (column 4) of our 
sample to document the evolution of ownership over time. We also present the mean, 
maximum, and minimum number of firms in each category and year.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our sample appears well balanced regarding firm types. We have three main groups of 
roughly equal sizes. Each year, we have approximately 50 firms in each category (widely held, 
family, and firms with another blockholder). Widely held firms represent 33% of the sample. 
Family firms are the most common type, representing approximately 35% of the sample. Of 
these, around one-third are at the founder stage and two-thirds at the descendant stage. Two-
thirds of family firms have family members active as CEOs or Chairman of the Board and that 
10% of family firms have a founder-CEO. Finally, 32% of our sample consists of firms with a 
controlling shareholder other than the founding family. In this group, 5% of firms are owned 
by the state, 15% by a private investor, 5% by another widely held corporation, 4% by another 
widely held financial firm, and 3% are miscellaneous. Proportions remain almost constant 
between the three decomposed periods. The ownership pattern is stable over time, as there are 
few changes in the controlling shareholders’ identity or the fraction of voting rights they hold. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample (column 1), as well as for 
the different categories of firms, grouped by the type of controlling shareholder, namely family 
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firms (column 2), non-family firms (column 3), the latter being further subdivided in widely 
held firms (column 4) and firms held by another blockholder (column 5). Table 2 also presents 
(i) the means of the different variables used in the analysis and (ii) the results of the tests of 
difference in means between family firms and other controlling shareholder types. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The average monthly raw stock return for the entire sample is 0.59% per month. Family 
firms have significantly higher average raw returns (0.91%) than other firm categories. Widely 
held firms have the lowest average raw return over the analyzed period (0.25%). Moreover, 
family firms appear to be significantly more profitable than other firms according to their mean 
ROA (5.69%) and return on equity (ROE) (4.98%). The profitability of family firms is positive 
over the period, while that of other firms is negative. In terms of risk, family firms are slightly 
less risky than other firms in the sample. They also have lower betas (except for the firms with 
another blockholder that have a slightly lower mean beta of 0.87) and lower volatility. In terms 
of control-enhancing mechanisms, family firms have an average wedge of 1.57, while this value 
is close to one for all other categories This means that the largest shareholder in family firms 
has, on average, 1.5 more voting than cash-flow rights, while the other groups respect the one-
vote-one-share principle. Despite the progressive reduction of dual-class shares structures in 
Switzerland, family firms still use this technique to reinforce the control they have over the 
firm. Interestingly, the mean wedge for widely held firms is slightly below one. This is due to 
some firms having limitations on voting rights and some large shareholders having less voting 
than cash-flow rights. Concerning the other firm characteristics, family firms and firms held by 
another blockholder have higher book-to-market ratios and less liquid stocks (higher Amihud’s  
illiquidity ratio) and are generally smaller than widely held firms (in terms of market value, 
total assets, or net sales). While firms held by another blockholder are the oldest, widely held 
firms are, on average, the youngest. We also observe that family firms are more generous with 
their shareholders, as they pay significantly more dividends than other firms (they have an 
average payout ratio of 1.92%, while other firms have 1.42%). This is consistent with the 
findings of Isakov and Weisskopf (2015), who document that family firms have higher payouts 
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in Switzerland. Regarding leverage, family firms have slightly lower levels of leverage, on 
average, than non-family firms. These results are consistent with the previous literature.6 
 
4. Stock market returns of founding family firms 
This section analyzes the stock market performance of family firms. We use two 
complementary approaches: portfolio-based and firm-characteristics. The latter allows for a 
larger number of risk factors/firm characteristics that impact stock returns than the standard 
portfolio approach, which is based on size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. Moreover, 
the portfolio-based approach has some drawbacks in the case of Switzerland.  
 
4.1 Portfolio-based approach  
To study the impact of family ownership on stock performance, we follow the 
methodology of Gompers et al. (2003), which is based on grouping stocks with similar 
characteristics in portfolios. At the beginning of each year, we build equally weighted 
portfolios7, containing the stocks of all firms with the same type of controlling shareholder 
(family, widely held, other blockholder). Portfolio returns are subsequently calculated at the 
end of each month over the entire year. At the beginning of the next year, portfolios are 
reformed and returns calculated again. We then create different self-financing strategies that 
are long in one portfolio and short in the second one (e.g., long on the portfolio of family firms 
and short on the portfolio of widely held firms). 
We then use a multi-factor model to analyze the performance of portfolios and 
strategies. Specifically, we use the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), which is an extension 
of the classical Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French (1992, 1993)), with an 
additional factor reflecting the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We estimate 
the model as: 
 1 2 3 4α β β β β= + + + + +pt p p t p t p t p t ptR RMRF SMB HML WML e , (1) 
where Rpt is the return of portfolio p minus the risk-free rate in month t, RMRFt the expected 
market return minus the risk-free rate in month t, SMBt the difference between the expected 
return in month t of a portfolio of small-cap stocks and that of a portfolio of large cap stocks, 
                                                          
6 Schmid (2013) shows that leverage is lower for family firms in Germany, which has an institutional and economic 
environment similar to the Swiss one.  
7 The use of equally weighted portfolios is more appropriate for the Swiss market, since some firms are very large 
and represent an important fraction of total market capitalization. The use of value-weighted portfolios is less 
informative, since these portfolios would essentially reflect the returns of these few large firms. 
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HMLt the difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of stocks with high 
book-to-market and that of a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market, and WMLt the 
difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio with stocks having 
outperformed the previous month and that of a portfolio with stocks having underperformed the 
previous month. Alpha measures the abnormal return an investor would have obtained monthly 
from 2003 to 2013. This model necessitates monthly estimates of the four relevant factors, as 
well as the risk-free rate for Switzerland. We use local factors, as Griffin (2002) concludes that 
domestic factors explain better time-series variations in returns than world factor models and 
generally have smaller pricing errors than their international counterparts. The returns of these 
factors have been computed by Ammann and Steiner (2008) for 1990–2014.8 However, 
evidence on the validity of the four-factor model for the Swiss stock market is weak (e.g., Fama 
and French (1998) and Ammann and Steiner (2008)). Moreover, the reliability of these factors 
is not guaranteed, as the number of stocks available for their construction is limited. We 
therefore also use a simple one-factor model as an alternative to measuring abnormal returns. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3. The first three columns report 
abnormal returns and the risk coefficients for the three portfolios representing different types 
of firms, while the last two columns report the alphas of two self-financing strategies. Both 
strategies are long on the portfolio of family firms. The first strategy shorts a portfolio of non-
family firms, while the second shorts a portfolio of widely held firms. 
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Panel A shows the results for the four-factor model. The abnormal returns of the 
portfolio of family firms is positive and insignificant, while the returns of non-family or widely 
held firms are negative and insignificant. The returns on self-financing strategies long on family 
firms and short on widely held or non-family firms yield significant and positive alphas of 
0.25% and 0.47% per month, respectively (3.04% and 5.78% per annum). However, the results 
must be interpreted with caution, as explained above. We therefore use a single-factor model 
as well, whose results are shown in Panel B. We find the alphas of different long-only strategies 
are all higher than in the four-factor model. This time, the portfolio of family firms displays a 
positive and significant alpha of 0.57% per month (7.05% per annum), while the portfolios of 
                                                          
8 These factors are available on Amman’s website (www.manuel-ammann.com). We thank the authors for making 
these factors available to other researchers. 
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non-family and widely held firms are positive and insignificant. Regarding self-financed 
strategies, the strategy that sells short the portfolio of widely held firms yields a significant and 
abnormal return of 0.34% per month (4.08% per annum). This result is similar to those in Panel 
A. As robustness check, we repeat the analysis with value-weighted portfolios to verify if the 
results are not driven by smaller firms, and find qualitatively similar results.9 Generally, this 
initial analysis shows that an investment in a portfolio of family firms yields the highest risk-
adjusted returns among the different portfolios containing firms grouped according to their 
controlling shareholder. These results confirm those in Table 2 (i.e. family firms have the 
highest returns). 
 
4.2 Firm-characteristics approach 
The main issue with the portfolio approach is that it does not consider other firm 
characteristics besides size, book-to-market, and momentum. To control for firm 
characteristics, we follow Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) and use two methods to estimate 
the following multivariate regression: 
 = + + +it i i it i it itr a b X c eZ , (2) 
where rit is the total returns for firm i in month t, Xit the dummy variable indicating the presence 
of one type of shareholder in the ownership structure, and Zit a vector of firm characteristics. 
The first method is a pooled panel regression (POLS2C), where standard errors are two-
dimensionally clustered along the firm and time dimensions. The second method is a Fama-
MacBeth (Fama and MacBeth (1973)) approach (FMB), where cross-sectional regressions are 
run separately for each month of the sample period, and then the values of the final parameters 
are determined using the mean and statistical significance of the time-series statistics of these 
monthly estimates.10 In both cases, we also control for industry effects by including industry 
dummies in all regressions, based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 10 industry 
classification. Following Brennan et al. (1998), Gompers et al. (2003), and Lilienfeld-Toal and 
Ruenzi (2014), our set of control variables includes the logs of book-to-market and of market 
value as proxies for the size and value effect, respectively. We also use the price of stocks and 
volatility of returns, as well as three variables for returns 3–2, 6–4, and 12–7 months before the 
month of analysis as proxies for the momentum factor. As suggested by Edmans (2011), we 
                                                          
9 The results are not shown due to space considerations, but are available upon request.  
10 Two-dimensional clustering provides asymptotically unbiased standard errors, while the FMB estimates of 
standard errors can be biased in the presence of firm fixed effects. It is therefore recommended to use the two 
methods, since we cannot rule out the presence of firm fixed effects in our regressions. 
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further control for stock liquidity by using the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)). We 
also consider the dividend yield and leverage and, as proxies for firm’s efficiency, the operating 
margin and sales over total assets. Finally, we use asset and sales growth over the past year and 
over the past five years. All variables are detailed in the Appendix. 
The results of the multivariate regressions with firm characteristics are shown in Table 
4. Among the different control variables, we observe that some characteristics not included in 
the Carhart four-factor model appear to be significantly related to individual stock returns. 
These variables are Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, dividend yield, leverage, operating margin, sales, 
and asset growth. This indicates that the firm-characteristics approach is complementary to the 
portfolio-based one and relevant to analyzing stocks in Switzerland. The main results are the 
significant coefficients obtained in both approaches for the family dummy. These results reflect 
that family firms earn significantly higher returns compared to other firms in our sample, and 
that these differences cannot be explained by differences in firm characteristics. 
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Firms with a family holding at least 20% of the voting rights earn a significant additional 
monthly return of 0.52% (6.42% annually) compared to firms with no family holding in the 
POLS2C regression. The coefficients differ slightly between the regression approaches, but 
both are statistically significant. These results confirm and reinforce those from the portfolio-
based approach: a family as a controlling shareholder is associated with higher stock returns.  
 
4.3 Longevity of outperformance 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 might be due to market mispricing for the effect of family 
ownership. However, since ownership is stable over time, an efficient market should correct its 
error and abnormal return should decline over time, as the market learns the true value of these 
firms. We therefore study the longevity of outperformance. We follow Edmans (2011) and 
assess it with a long-term event study approach, computing cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). The “event” is the end-of-year disclosure of firm ownership structure. Each year, we 
calculate for each firm and each month an abnormal monthly return by subtracting the market 
return from the raw stock return. Starting in January, we cumulate these benchmark-adjusted 
returns over horizons of x months (12, 24, 36, 48, or 60). We then create equally-weighted 
portfolios, containing stocks of firms with similar ownership. Table 5 presents the average 
CARs over different horizons for different portfolios, obtained by computing the portfolio 
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average returns over different years in the sample. Table 5 shows the results for the portfolio 
constructed from the entire sample of firms, as well as subsamples of firms with similar types 
of controlling shareholders, and also the differences in mean returns between portfolios. 
 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
These results first show that the CARs for the entire population of non-financial Swiss 
firms are mostly not statistically different from zero for the five horizons in column (1). 
However, when distinguishing between family and non-family firms, we observe an important 
difference as, for each period, the CARs for the groups of family firms are positive and 
statistically different from zero, whereas those for both the other groups (non-family and widely 
held firms) are negative and statistically different from zero. Second, the differences in means 
tests confirm the outperformance of family firms over time compared to non-family or widely 
held firms. Finally, CARs are continuously growing for all groups (positively for the family 
firms and negatively for the two others), suggesting the market is not eliminating mispricing 
over the long term. We thus conclude there is persistence in the outperformance of family firms 
and that mispricing is never fully corrected, which is a sign of market inefficiency with respect 
to family ownership.  
 
5. Family firm characteristics and stock returns 
The previous section showed that the stocks of firms with a family member as a 
controlling shareholder outperform the stocks of other firms and yield significantly positive 
risk-adjusted returns. This outperformance also lasts over time and the associated market 
inefficiency does not disappear. Here, we investigate if stock market returns are related to 
different family firm characteristics to identify the potential determinants of outperformance.  
 
5.1 Level of family control and stock returns 
We first investigate if there is a relationship between the level of family control, 
measured as the proportion of voting rights held by the family, and stock returns. The impact 
of this variable can be interpreted in two opposite ways: a high stake in the firm may reflect a 
high level of control and a higher risk of expropriation for minority investors, while a high stake 
by the family may also reflect family members have a large fraction of their wealth invested in 
the company and will not undertake value-destroying actions that would harm their own 
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interests. This means a high stake could be beneficial for minority shareholders. The previous 
literature already investigated the relationship between firm performance and the stake of the 
largest shareholder: Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), and Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) find a nonlinear (concave) relationship between 
ownership and accounting performance. They also find that performance first increases as 
family ownership increases (incentive effect) but, after a certain level of ownership, 
performance decreases (entrenchment effect). The explanation for this concave relationship is 
that agency problems (risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholder) become too high when the controlling shareholder has a high stake. This 
phenomenon has been documented for profitability and valuation ratios, but not for stock 
returns. 
To investigate the relationship between returns and control levels, we first compute the 
different descriptive statistics of family firms by distinguishing three sub-groups according to 
the level of voting rights a family has in the firm. The results are presented in Table 6. The first 
group contains firms where families have 20–50% voting rights, a moderate level of control 
that does not allow full control over the firm. If a family holds more than 50% of voting rights, 
it has the absolute majority, thus making most standard corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
annual meeting votes or takeover threat) ineffective. We split the firms with family stakes above 
50% into two groups to determine whether firms with very high levels of control have a 
different impact on returns: 50–80% and 80–100% of voting rights. In a firm with more than 
80% of voting rights controlled by the family, there is virtually no possible counter-power to 
the family, and outside shareholders are totally dependent on family decisions. However, in a 
firm with a family stake of 50–80%, there is potentially more room for its power to be 
challenged by some other large investor, such as an institutional investor or another large 
blockholder. Note that these high levels of control do not automatically imply low stock 
liquidity, since these firms frequently use control enhancing mechanisms and families have 
much lower cash-flow than voting rights. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 6, the mean returns increase monotonically with the stake of the family. For 
families having a stake between 80 and 100%, the mean monthly return is 1.01%, while for 
those holding a stake of 20–50%, it is 0.88%. Table 6 also shows important differences between 
the different groups of family firms. The group of firms with high family control tends to 
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include older and smaller firms, and firms with higher liquidity, lower leverage, and higher 
book-to-market ratios. To ascertain whether the documented differences in raw returns are real, 
it is important to adjust for these different factors when analyzing returns. We therefore 
investigate the relationship between family stakes and returns by estimating firm-characteristics 
regressions (equation (2)). The results are presented in Table 7.11 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
We first regress returns on the percentage of control rights of the family, and obtain a 
positive and significant coefficient that indicates a monotonic positive relationship between 
stock returns and the family stake. Since the literature shows a concave relationship between 
performance and control levels, we add the squared stake to the previous equation. The 
coefficients are not significant, which means the relation is linear and not concave and there is 
no negative impact of high level of control on returns. This is confirmed by the third group of 
results, where we split the family dummy variable in three, according to the level of family 
ownership. We find the dummy is not significant for the 20–50% stake, but it is for the two 
other stake ranges. Moreover, the coefficients are largest for the group of firms with high family 
stakes. The outperformance of this type of firms is 0.91% per month (or 11.48% per annum) 
for the pooled regression results. This means that, among the group of family firms, those with 
high family control earn the highest returns. This contrasts the results in the literature on 
valuation and profitability ratios, where performance decreases at high levels of control. This 
can be interpreted as a reward for holding stocks with a high level of family control. As these 
high control levels imply the inefficiency of most standard shareholder protection mechanisms, 
higher returns can also be interpreted as a premium compensating the high risk of expropriation 
borne by outside investors.  
 
5.2. Other specific family features and stock returns 
Besides the level of family control, the literature on the relationship between family 
ownership and performance reached a number of converging conclusions regarding the link 
between family characteristics and performance. A first important distinction between family 
firms is the family generation and whether it is the descendants or the founder that runs the 
                                                          
11 To save space, we do not present the control variables coefficients for the further results of firm-characteristics 
regressions. These are available upon request.  
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firm. A standard result is that descendant firms tend to underperform founder-led firms. This 
has been documented in different contexts by Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), 
or Villalonga and Amit (2006). The last study argues that descendant control leads to poor 
corporate financial performance because of weaker abilities. The literature on family firm 
control thus suggests that the risk of family expropriation may be particularly high when 
descendants control the firm. A second important distinction made in the literature is whether 
the firm is run by professional managers or family members. The main argument is that having 
family members in key management positions is suboptimal, since they do not necessarily have 
the best talent or skills to run the company compared to outside managers. The best scenario 
for a family firm would thus be to have the firm run by hired professional managers with the 
family being a passive investor. Having a family member active in the firm would then represent 
a risk because of his potential lack of skills and/or additional control this would imply for the 
family. From this viewpoint, having an active family member could be perceived as an 
additional risk of expropriation for outside investors. However, there is one exception: when 
the founder of the firm is also the CEO. Adams et al. (2009) and Fahlenbrach (2009) find that 
founder-CEO firms tend to have a better performance than the other firms. This can be 
explained by founders having strong incentives and motivation to develop their own firm. We 
analyze whether these three distinctions (founder/descendant, active/passive, founder-
CEO/other family firms) yield different returns to investors. We first compute descriptive 
statistics for the different categories of family firms, and the results are presented in Table 8. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The results indicate that firms at the descendant stage have slightly higher mean returns 
than those at the founder stage. For control variables, descendant firms are larger and older. For 
the second distinction above, we find that firms with an active family member have higher 
returns than firms with passive owners. The latter also tend to be larger and older than firms 
with active family members. Finally, contrary to extant literature, family firms with founder-
CEOs have comparatively lower returns. To verify if these differences are significant and not 
due to difference in other firm-related variables, we estimate firm-characteristics regressions 
(equation (2)), with dummy variables representing the different categories of family firms. The 
results are presented in Table 9. 
 




The regression results confirm the results in Table 8 for the first two distinctions of 
family firms. We find the family dummy is only significant for firms at the descendant stage 
and those where the family is active and has operational control. Regarding the distinction 
between founder-CEO and other firms, the latter have significantly higher returns only in the 
POLS2C approach.  
These results complement those obtained in section 5.1. Here, we investigate if the 
several distinctions of family firms that appeared to be related to firm performance in the 
previous literature also affect returns. Among the different distinctions, returns are always 
higher for the categories of firms potentially associated with more agency problems. Family 
firms at the descendant stage, with active family members or not run by a founder-CEO, are 
less efficient than other family firms. Higher abnormal returns for these firms could therefore 
be interpreted as a compensation for the higher risk of expropriation present in those firms. 
We have identified several categories of family firms that earn higher abnormal returns. 
These firms are those perceived as presenting a potentially higher risk of expropriation 
(represented by a high family stake, involvement of the family in the firm, or the firm being at 
the descendant stage) for outside investors.  
 
6. Earnings announcements, analysts’ surprises, and abnormal returns 
One possible explanation for the outperformance of family firms over the analyzed 11 
years is that investors are unable to properly assess the value of these firms and tend to be 
skeptical about their performance because of the high expropriation risk. The true economic 
performance of these firms can be assessed based on the information they disclose. An event 
with an important informational content is the disclosure of annual earnings. When these are 
announced, investors have accurate and detailed information about the firm and readjust their 
opinion accordingly. As suggested by Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), one 
way to verify if market participants are surprised is to use analysts’ forecasts of earnings per 
share (EPS) as a proxy for market expectations and compare them with the actual published 
EPS. Another more direct way to determine how investors integrate information into prices is 
to look at market reactions around earnings announcements. Here, we consider both measures 
and differentiate the surprises and market reactions observed around earnings announcements 
for family and non-family firms, as well as for the different categories of family firms. 
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To measure analysts’ forecasts of earnings, we use the mean EPS estimated nine months 
before the release date of annual results. This ensures analysts know the earnings from the 
previous year when making their forecasts. The published EPS is used as the true EPS. The 
estimates are obtained from FactSet. This one-year surprise is standard in the literature and has 
been used by Giroud and Mueller (2011), Edmans (2011), Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014), 
among others. We define earnings surprises in relative terms and normalize the difference 
between realized and expected EPS by the share price at the time of the forecast. For a particular 
firm and year, the surprise is:  
 
 
Published EPS Consensus EPSSurprise
Share Price
−
= . (3) 
 
The market reaction around annual earnings announcements is measured by the CAR 
for a specific firm and year, computed from an event study over the window [-1; +1]. We 
estimate normal returns with the market model and use the SPI as the market portfolio. The 
parameters of the market model are estimated for a window of 200 days, 20 days before the 
announcement date. Table 10 provides the mean values for the earnings surprises and market 
reactions for the entire market and firms with different types of controlling shareholders. We 
also compute the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Table 10 shows that, for the entire market, the earnings surprise is negative, which 
means that, one-year ahead, the consensus is above the true EPS and the market is overly 
optimistic regarding future earnings. This is consistent with the literature (see e.g., Brown 
(1997) for the US or Galanti and Vaubourg (2017) for France). A comparison between the mean 
surprise of family firms and of non-family firms shows that the market is more positively 
surprised by family firms, with an average surprise of -1.31% for family firms and -2.34% for 
other firms. This is also confirmed by the results of the tests of differences in means between 
family firms earnings surprises and those of other firms, all being positive and significant. For 
the number of positive and negative surprises for different firms, family firms have a larger 
proportion of positive surprises (0.76) than other firms (0.67). This also means that, despite 
analysts’ tendencies to produce forecasts on average above the realized EPS, realized EPS are 
above the forecasts more frequently for family firms than for other firms. These two results 
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indicate the disclosures of annual earnings by family firms surprise the market more positively 
than for other firms. Regarding the way investors react to earnings announcements, we find a 
significant average CAR of 1.16% for family firms, while an insignificant 0.08% is obtained 
for non-family firms. These average CARs are significantly different from each other and 
indicate a strong positive price reaction after family firms announce their earnings. As for 
earnings surprises, the relative frequency of positive CARs is higher for family firms. However, 
the differences in surprises and market reactions might be due to different confounding factors. 
We thus use the approaches of Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011) and estimate 
the following regression: 
 = + + +it i i it i it ity a b X c eZ , (4) 
where yit is either the earnings surprise or the CAR of firm i in year t, Xit a dummy variable for 
family firms, and Zit a vector of control variables. The set of control variables Zit includes the 
lagged logarithm of the book-to-market ratio and market capitalization at year-end as proposed 
by Core et al. (2006). We also add analyst coverage, since it might impact forecast accuracy 
and market reactions in Switzerland as some firms are followed by a few analysts only. We 
estimate equation (4) using a pooled regression with industry fixed effects. The results are 
presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
The regression results confirm those in Table 10, as the dummy for family firms is 
positive and significant for both analysts’ surprises and the CARs arounds earnings 
announcement date. Therefore, it can be concluded that analysts are systematically positively 
surprised by the good performance of family firms and that these firms have a stronger market 
reaction to earnings announcements. These results show that the abnormal returns of family 
firms can be partly explained by annual earnings announcements surprises as the average CAR 
is 1.16% while the annualized abnormal returns for family firms is between 2.8–7.1% 
depending on the risk-adjustment method used.  
As shown in section 5, abnormal returns are associated with specific family firm 
features. We therefore investigate if there is a relation between these characteristics and the 
measures of earnings surprise and market reaction. We first determine whether there is a 
relationship with the level of family control. The results are presented in Table 12, and the 
different descriptive statistics are provided for family firms grouped by their level of voting 
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rights. The surprises are larger for family firms with a stake above 50% than for family firms 
with a moderate stake. In terms of the ratio of positive surprises, family firms with high levels 
of family control have more positive than negative surprises and this ratio is larger than for the 
two other categories of family firms.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
Finally, regarding the market reaction to earnings announcements, family firms with an 
80–100% stake have average CARs of 2.60%, while those of firms with moderate family levels 
of control have average positive CARs of 0.85%. We also observe that the relative frequency 
of positive CARs is higher for family firms with a high control level. The descriptive statistics 
are confirmed by the regression analysis in Table 11. We find significant positive coefficients 
for the variable of family control rights for surprises and CARs in columns (2) and (5). When 
we decompose the family dummy into three dummy variables representing different levels of 
control by the family in columns (3) and (6), we find positive and significant coefficients for 
the levels of control beyond 50%. The largest estimates are in both cases obtained for family 
firms with more than 80% of voting rights. These results indicate that the market is positively 
surprised by family firms’ performance and this surprise is more significant for family firms 
where the family has the highest levels of control, making the extraction of private benefits 
more likely. We next investigate if earnings surprises and market reactions are related to other 
family firm characteristics. Table 13 provides descriptive statistics, while Table 14 presents the 
regression results. 
 
[Insert Tables 13 and 14 here] 
 
We first analyze the founder/descendant stage distinction. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 
13 show descendant firms have slightly larger earnings surprises, a larger proportion of positive 
surprises, and larger average CARs at earnings announcements. The regression results in 
columns (1) and (4) of Table 14 show descendant firms have significantly higher surprises and 
CARs than firms at the founder stage. These results are consistent with those for returns. 
Regarding the distinction between firms with active members in the management and those 
with passive owners, the evidence is mixed. As shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 13, firms 
with active family members have larger forecasting errors and proportion of positive surprises. 
However, these firms have lower CARs than firms with passive owners. These results are 
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confirmed by the regression results in columns (2) and (5) of Table 14. Regarding the distinction 
between firms with a founder-CEO and other family firms, we obtain consistent results. 
Founder-CEO firms have smaller earnings surprises and CARs, as shown in columns (6) and 
(7) of Table 13 and in columns (3) and (6) of Table 14. The additional results in Tables 13 and 
14 confirm those obtained in Tables 11 and 12 for family control levels. We find that family 
firms with characteristics perceived as presenting more expropriation risk have higher monthly 
abnormal returns, and also larger earnings surprises and CARs around earnings announcements.  
These results show that the market is regularly and positively surprised by the good 
operational performance of family firms and the absence of private benefit extraction in firms 
where these are presumably more likely to happen. These positive EPS surprises translate into 
positive abnormal returns. However, the magnitude of market reactions found around earnings 
announcements cannot completely explain the abnormal returns in section 4, because they are 
not the sole information events when the market learns about the true performance of family 
firms. Information is also disclosed on other occasions, such as interim results reports or firm-
specific events, that have not been investigated in this paper. Nevertheless, the evidence 
provided in this article should be sufficient to conclude that the positive abnormal returns earned 
by family firms are caused by market inefficiencies, by the presence of potential agency 
problems in family firms, and by the fear of outside investors’ expropriation.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Many listed firms are owned and controlled by the founding families worldwide. 
However, the impact of such ownership structures on firm performance is not yet fully 
understood. This paper investigates an aspect that has hitherto received limited attention in the 
academic literature by taking the point of view of an investor and analyzing the relationship 
between ownership structure and stock market returns. The lack of academic evidence and 
interest on this issue can be explained by that, in efficient markets, there should be no abnormal 
returns associated with a firm’s ownership structure, since this information is public and should 
be fully integrated in stock prices. However, the results of our empirical investigations on the 
Swiss stock market show different results. We analyze panel data from January 2003 to 
December 2013 for the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss Exchange, 
and find that family firms outperform other firms by 2.8–7.1% per annum. To explain these 
abnormal returns, we investigate if stock returns are associated with different family firm 
characteristics. We find that returns are positively associated with the level of family control, a 
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variable that measures the level of power the family holds over the firm. For instance, an 
investment in firms with families controlling between 80 and 100% of the voting rights 
generates an abnormal return of 12.5% per annum. Significantly higher returns are also 
observed for firms run by descendants, those with family members active in the management, 
or with no founder-CEO.  
It is well established that the main agency problem faced by a listed firm with a 
controlling shareholder is the potential conflict of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders. For family firms, agency problems are not likely to materialize as pure wealth 
expropriation, since family wealth might also be negatively affected by such practices, but they 
can turn into the extraction of private benefits of control. For family firms, these private benefits 
are frequently associated with decisions that maximize the utility of the family but not the value 
of the firm. The goals of these decisions can be firm growth, reputation, or survival. Family 
firms can also suffer from more specific problems, such as family feuds or nepotism, which 
have a negative impact on firm value. Outside shareholders of family firms are exposed to all 
these potential problems. We therefore interpret the abnormal returns of family firms as a 
compensation for exposure to these risks. Our analysis of the returns for subgroups of family 
firms confirms this interpretation, as higher returns are earned by firms with features that make 
agency problems more severe. For example, a firm where the family controls 80–100% of the 
votes presents almost no protection for outside shareholders, as most corporate governance 
mechanisms are made ineffective by such a high level of control.  
We complement the above analysis by examining how family firms react to earnings 
announcements, and find that family firms have significantly larger earnings surprises than 
other firms. These translate into significantly stronger market reactions, measured by CARs 
around the announcement date, thus leading to the positive abnormal returns observed for 
family firms. Market participants appear to be systematically positively surprised by the content 
of earnings announcements of family firms. We also analyze the reactions of the different 
subgroups of family firms and confirm that the strongest reactions are observed for firms with 
the highest risks of expropriation. Although the reaction to annual earnings announcements 
cannot completely explain the observed abnormal returns, our evidence is consistent with the 
outperformance of family firms being due to the presence of potential agency problems in 
family firms and the fear of outside investors’ expropriation. The positive abnormal returns can 
be interpreted as a premium for bearing the higher expropriation risk.  
Overall, the market inefficiency documented here can be related to the previous 
literature on the difficulty to properly value the true impact of certain firm characteristics, such 
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as employee satisfaction or CEO ownership. In our case, since family control can have a 
positive or a negative impact on the economic efficiency of the firm, the market is unable to 
properly integrate information about ownership into stock prices. Our results thus show that 
market participants correct their poor assessment of these firms when these announce their 
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Table 1: Sample composition and evolution over the time 
This table presents the composition of the entire sample, which includes 195 companies for 2003–2013 (19,604 firm-month observations). The table also presents the mean of the main different 
dummy variables related to the ownership structure. The variables are described in the Appendix. A company is considered controlled by a shareholder if he is the largest shareholder and holds 
more than 20% of the voting rights. Column 1 shows the results for the entire period, while columns 2–4 show the composition of the first, middle, and last year, respectively. Columns 5–7 present 
the average number of firms per year for the entire period, as well as the minimum and maximum number of firms. 
 All 2003 2008 2013 Number of firms per year 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Widely held firms 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.29 49.7 41 55 
Family firms 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.33 52.8 46 60 
Family firms at founder stage 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 18.8 14 23 
Family firms at descendant 
stage 
0.23 0.25 0.22 0.22 34.0 31 37 
Family active 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.19 33.9 25 43 
Family non-active 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 18.9 15 21 
Family with founder CEO 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 5.5 3 8 
Family without founder CEO 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.30 47.3 40 54 
Other blockholders 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.38 47.5 40 58 
State 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 7.6 6 9 
Private investor 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.21 21.6 17 30 
Widely held corporation 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 7.6 5 12 
Widely held financial 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 5.8 1 9 
Miscellaneous 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 4.9 3 6 
N 19604 1795 1800 1680 150 140 156 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for different types of controlling shareholders 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the study. A more detailed description of the variables is given in the Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented 
for the entire sample (column 1), as well as for the different types of controlling shareholders, namely family, non-family, widely held, and firms with another blockholders (in columns 2–5, 
respectively). The table also presents the results of difference in means tests for the variables between the major groups, that is, between family firms and non-family firms (column 6), between 
family firms and widely held firms (column 7), and between family firms and other blockholder firms (column 8). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance. 












 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stock returns (in %) 0.59 0.91 0.41 0.25 0.58 0.49*** 0.65*** 0.32** 
Return-on-assets (in %) 0.58 5.69 -2.24 -0.63 -4.00 7.93*** 6.31** 9.68** 
Return-on-equity (in %) -10.27 4.98 -18.75 -7.31 -31.08 23.73* 12.30* 36.06 
Beta 1.01 0.98 1.03 1.19 0.87 -0.05*** -0.21*** 0.10*** 
Volatility 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
Wedge 1.22 1.57 1.02 0.98 1.07 0.55*** 0.60*** 0.51*** 
Age (in years) 73.2 69.8 75.1 57.5 93.6 -5.3*** 12.3*** -23.8*** 
Book-to-market 0.82 0.87 0.80 0.65 0.97 0.06*** 0.22*** -0.10*** 
Amihud's illiquidity (in ‰) 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.46 0.86 -0.08 0.12* -0.29*** 
Dividend yield (in %) 1.60 1.92 1.42 1.36 1.49 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.43*** 
Leverage 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16 -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.04*** 
Market value (in million 
CHF) 
5159 4786 5363 9076 1463 -576* -4289*** 3323*** 
Total assets (in million 
CHF) 
3852 3629 3976 6358 1375 -348* -2730*** 2254*** 
Net sales (in million CHF) 3257 3296 3235 5051 1258 61 -1754*** 2039*** 






Table 3: Results for the portfolio-based approach  
This table presents the coefficients and robust standard errors of the portfolio-based approach for different portfolios. The 
regressions are based on 132 observations, with data from January 2003 to December 2013. Panel A shows the results for the 
four-factor model of Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997), which are returns on zero investment portfolios that 
capture the effects of the market (RMRF), size (SMB), book-to-market value (HML), and momentum effect (WML). These 
data for Switzerland are downloaded from Amman’s website (www.manuel-ammann.com). Panel B shows the results for the 
one-factor model, which only includes RMRF. Columns 1–3 show the results of the regression for the portfolios containing 
firms with similar types of controlling shareholders, whereas columns 4 and 5 provide results for the main strategies (family 
versus non-family firms, and family versus widely held firms). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are calculated using Huber-White estimators and are shown between parentheses. 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Alpha 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0023 0.0025* 0.0047*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0017) 
RMRF 1.1129*** 1.2120*** 1.3405*** -0.0991** -0.2276*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0438) (0.0470) (0.0459) (0.0493) 
SMB 0.7334*** 0.8867*** 0.9147*** -0.1533** -0.1813** 
 (0.0595) (0.0608) (0.0715) (0.0633) (0.0712) 
HML 0.4031*** 0.4393*** 0.3798*** -0.0362 0.0233 
 (0.0762) (0.0664) (0.0824) (0.0770) (0.0858) 
WML 0.0373 0.0442 0.1127* -0.0069 -0.0754 
 (0.0686) (0.0579) (0.0673) (0.0491) (0.0562) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 
R2 0.8719 0.9016 0.8648 0.0850 0.1470 
 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Alpha 0.0057** 0.0038 0.0023 0.0019 0.0034** 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
RMRF 0.9185*** 0.9782*** 1.0648*** -0.0597* -0.1462*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0751) (0.0775) (0.0347) (0.0393) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 




Table 4: Results for the firm-characteristics approach 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time 
and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FMB) on a sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to 
December 2013. The dependent variable is a firm’s monthly stock return. In all the regressions, industry dummies based on the 
ICB 10 industry classification are included (but not shown). All control variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 (1) (2) 
Family dummy 0.0052*** 0.0023* 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Wedge 0.0002 0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
logBM -0.0058*** -0.0080*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
logSize 0.0006 -0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Price 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 0.0857 -0.0629 
 (0.054) (0.040) 
Amihud’s illiquidity -1.2218*** -3.6409*** 
 (0.390) (1.251) 
Dividend yield -0.0023** -0.0015*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.0110 -0.0152** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Operating margin 0.0000* 0.0002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales to total assets -0.0005 -0.0015 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
AG_1year 0.0258*** 0.0215*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
AG_5year -0.0204 -0.0156 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
SG_1year -0.0001 0.0194*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) 
SG_5year -0.0019 -0.0151 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
Return_2_3 0.0396* -0.0128 
 (0.022) (0.012) 
Return_4_6 0.0377** 0.0155* 
 (0.016) (0.009) 
Return_7_12 -0.0251* -0.0067 
 (0.013) (0.006) 
Intercept -0.0117 0.0287** 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB 
N 15546 15546 
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Table 5: Longevity analysis 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of an equally-weighted portfolio containing all firms in the sample 
(column (1)), as well as portfolios containing firms with the same type of controlling shareholders (columns 2–4). Each year, 
monthly abnormal returns are calculated for each firm and each month by subtracting the market return from the raw return of 
the stock. Starting in January, these benchmark-adjusted returns are cumulated over horizons of x months (12, 24, 36, 48, or 
60 months). The CARs are then averaged over the number of years and of firms. The table presents also the results of difference 
in means tests for the stock returns between the major groups, that is, between family firms and non-family firms (column 5), 
and between family firms and widely held firms (column 6). In columns 1–4, the stars indicate if the coefficients are statistically 
different from 0, whereas in columns, 5–6 they indicate the coefficients are statistically different from each other. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








Month Mean Mean Mean Mean Difference Difference 
1-12 -0.0077 0.0250** -0.0255** -0.0424** 0.0505*** 0.0674*** 
       
1-24 -0.0193 0.0508*** -0.0579*** -0.0990*** 0.1087*** 0.1498*** 
       
1-36 -0.0377* 0.0804*** -0.1042*** -0.1676*** 0.1846*** 0.2480*** 
       
1-48 -0.0268 0.1332*** -0.1190*** -0.2215*** 0.2521*** 0.3547*** 
       
1-60 -0.0264 0.1527*** -0.1323*** -0.2615*** 0.2850*** 0.4143*** 






Table 6: Descriptive statistics for family firms based on family control levels 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the study for the subsample of family firms, based 
on the family control levels. A detailed description of the variables is given in the Appendix. The mean of each variable is 
presented for the entire subsample of family firms (column 1), as well as for the three family control levels (columns 2–4). 
 Family firms Family firms  
(Stake 20–50) 
Family firms  
(Stake 50–80) 
Family firms  
(Stake 80–100) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock returns (%) 0.91 0.88 0.91 1.01 
Return-on-assets (in %) 5.69 4.97 6.24 5.81 
Return-on-equity (in %) 4.98 11.77 -0.92 8.81 
Beta 0.98 1.16 0.86 0.91 
Volatility 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Wedge 1.57 1.30 1.80 1.56 
Age (in years) 69.8 67.8 67.3 95.7 
Book-to-market 0.87 0.82 0.72 2.00 
Amihud's illiquidity (in ‰) 0.58 0.63 0.57 0.35 
Dividend yield (in %) 1.92 1.86 1.86 2.58 
Leverage 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.06 
Market value (in million 
CHF) 
4786 3263 6658 401 
Total assets (in million 
CHF) 
3629 3622 4095 693 
Net sales (in million CHF) 3296 3381 3643 662 





Table 7: Results for the firm-characteristics approach based on family control levels 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions 
(FMB) for the sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the firm’s monthly stock return. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 
industry classification are included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the percentage of voting rights held by the family (Family control rights) in columns 1 and 2, the 
percentage of voting rights held by the family (Family control rights) and its square ((Family control rights)2) in columns 3 and 4, and the family dummies according to the three different control 
levels in columns 5 and 6. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown). All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family control rights 0.0093*** 0.0058** 0.0111 -0.0028   
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008)   
(Family control rights)2   -0.0014 0.0137   
   (0.012) (0.011)   
Family firms (Stake 20–50)     0.0032 -0.0003 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Family firms (Stake 50–80)     0.0064** 0.0034* 
     (0.003) (0.002) 
Family firms (Stake 80–100)     0.0091*** 0.0098*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB 





Table 8: Descriptive statistics for family firms based on specific family firm characteristics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the study for the subsample of family firms, according to specific family firm features. A detailed description of the 
variables is given in the Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented for the entire subsample of family firms (column 1), as well as for the subcategories according to the generation of the 
family (columns 2 and 3), for the active or passive involvement of the family in the management (columns 4 and 5), and if the CEO is the founder of the family firm (columns 6 and 7). 











 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Stock returns (%) 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.97 0.79 0.66 0.93 
Return-on-assets (in %) 5.69 4.83 6.16 5.43 6.16 1.27 6.19 
Return-on-equity (in %) 4.98 7.20 3.75 -0.66 15.20 -0.65 5.63 
Beta 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.94 1.05 0.94 0.98 
Volatility 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Wedge 1.57 1.32 1.71 1.47 1.76 1.38 1.60 
Age (in years) 69.8 29.0 91.7 63.5 81.0 17.3 75.6 
Book-to-market 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.99 0.85 
Amihud's illiquidity (in ‰) 0.58 0.85 0.42 0.58 0.56 1.01 0.53 
Dividend yield (in %) 1.92 1.34 2.24 1.78 2.16 1.03 2.02 
Leverage 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.12 
Market value (in million 
CHF) 
4786 3596 5441 2516 8829 3009 4983 
Total assets (in million 
CHF) 
3629 2365 4310 1729 7058 1535 3857 
Net sales (in million CHF) 3296 3043 3440 1895 5813 1259 3519 




Table 9: Results for the firm-characteristics approach based on specific family firm characteristics 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions 
(FMB) for the sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the firm’s monthly stock return. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 
industry classification are included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the dummies for family firms at founder and descendant stages in columns 1 and 2, the active and 
non-active family dummies in columns 3 and 4, and dummies for family firms with founder CEO and without founder CEO in columns 5 and 6. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 
(coefficients not shown). All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family at founder stage 0.0034 0.0018     
 (0.003) (0.002)     
Family at descendant stage 0.0064*** 0.0030**     
 (0.002) (0.001)     
Family active   0.0065*** 0.0032*   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Family non-active   0.0025 0.0008   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Family with founder CEO     0.0031 0.0040 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Family without founder CEO     0.0053*** 0.0023 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB 




Table 10: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises and CARs based on the type of controlling shareholders 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings surprises and market reactions to annual earnings announcements (CAR). A more detailed description of the variables is given in the 
Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented for the entire sample (column 1), as well as for the main types of controlling shareholders (in columns 2–5, respectively). The table presents the 
results of differences in means tests for the variables between the major groups, that is, between family and non-family firms (column 6), family and widely held firms (column 7), and family and 
other blockholder firms (column 8). The table shows the number of positive and negative earnings surprises (CAR) and the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises (CAR). To eliminate 
outliers, surprises above 10% of the stock price are not taken into account, as well as those below the 1-percentile and above the 99-percentile *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In columns 1–5, the stars indicate if the coefficients are statistically different from 0, whereas in columns 6–8 they indicate if the coefficients are statistically different 
from each other based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance. 












      Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Surprise (in %) -1.9530*** -1.3055*** -2.3355*** -2.2596*** -2.4381*** 1.0300*** 0.9541** 1.1326** 
Surprise > 0 494 192 302 167 135    
Surprise < 0 707 254 453 267 186    
Ratio (+/-) 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.63 0.73    
N 1201 446 755 434 321    
         
CAR (in %) 0.4608*** 1.1577*** 0.0832 0.1564 0.0078 1.0745*** 1.0013*** 1.1499*** 
CAR > 0 837 328 509 266 243    
CAR < 0 710 216 494 243 251    
Ratio (+/-) 1.18 1.52 1.03 1.09 0.97    








Table 11: Multivariate regression results for earnings surprises and CARs based on family control levels  
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) for the sample of 195 firms from January 
2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the Surprise in columns 1–3 and the CAR in columns 4–6. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are 
included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the family dummy in columns 1 and 4, percentage of voting rights held by the family in columns 2 and 5, and family dummies 
according to the three different control levels in columns 3 and 6. All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 Surprise  CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family dummy 0.6343*   0.7632***   
 (0.348)   (0.292)   
Family control rights  1.6602**   1.6143***  
  (0.788)   (0.541)  
Family firms (Stake 20–50)   -0.0752   0.4642 
   (0.456)   (0.291) 
Family firms (Stake 50–80)   1.0467**   0.8823** 
   (0.524)   (0.368) 
Family firms (Stake 80–100)   2.4914*   2.0539** 
   (1.479)   (0.916) 
Analyst coverage -0.1357** -0.1259** -0.1246** -0.0256 -0.0183 -0.0219 
 (0.065) (0.062) (0.060) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
logSize (lagged) 1.1195*** 1.0777*** 1.0752*** -0.1957 -0.2231 -0.2081 
 (0.350) (0.340) (0.334) (0.254) (0.256) (0.257) 
logBM (lagged) -0.0864 -0.1721 -0.2042 0.1065 0.0487 0.0512 
 (0.666) (0.690) (0.702) (0.256) (0.251) (0.244) 
Intercept -24.8477*** -24.5598*** -24.5786*** 5.0043** 5.1641** 5.0609** 
 (4.907) (4.867) (4.878) (2.006) (2.037) (2.148) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C 






Table 12: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises and CARs based on family control levels 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings surprises and market reactions to annual earnings announcements (CAR). A more detailed description of the variable is given in the 
Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented for the entire subsample of family firms (column 1), as well as for the three family control levels (columns 2–4). The table also presents the 
results of differences in means tests for the variables between the different subcategories, that is, between family firms with medium and low stakes (column 5), with high and low stakes (column 
6), with high and medium stakes (column 7). The table also shows the number of positive and negative earnings surprises (CAR) and the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises (CAR). To 
eliminate outliers, surprises above 10% of the stock price are not taken into account, as well as those below the 1-percentile and above the 99-percentile. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In columns 1–4, the stars indicate the coefficients are statistically different from 0 whereas, in columns 5–7, they indicate if the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance.  
 Family firms Family firms  
(Stake 20–50) 
Family firms  
(Stake 50–80) 
Family firms  
(Stake 80–100) 
(3) - (2) (4) - (2) (4) - (3) 
     Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Surprise (in %) -1.3055*** -2.0556*** -0.7432** -0.7479 1.3123** 1.3077 -0.0047 
Surprise > 0 494 77 101 14    
Surprise < 0 707 114 128 12    
Ratio (+/-) 0.70 0.68 0.79 1.17    
N 446 191 229 26    
        
CAR (in %) 1.1577*** 0.8521*** 1.2176*** 2.6047*** 0.3655 1.7526* 1.3871 
CAR > 0 328 134 170 24    
CAR < 0 216 88 117 11    
CAR (+/-) 1.52 1.52 1.45 2.18    









Table 13: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises and CARs based on specific family firm characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the earnings surprises and market reactions to annual earnings announcements (CAR). A more detailed description of the variable is given in the 
Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented for the entire subsample of family firms (column 1), as well as for the three family control levels (columns 2–4). The table also presents the 
results of differences in means tests between the different subcategories, that is, between family firms with medium and low stakes (column 5), with high and low stakes (column 6), and with high 
and medium stakes (column 7). The table also shows the number of positive and negative earnings surprises (CAR) and the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises (CAR). To eliminate 
outliers, surprises above 10% of the stock price are not taken into account, as well as those below the 1-percentile and above the 99-percentile. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In columns 1–7, the stars indicate if the coefficients are statistically different from 0 whereas, in columns 8–10, they indicate if the coefficients are statistically different 





















(2) - (3) (4) - (5) (6) - (7) 
        Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Surprise (in %) -1.3055*** -1.3227*** -1.2957*** -1.0719*** -1.6117*** -1.7947*** -1.2639*** -0.0270 0.5398 -0.5308 
Surprise > 0 494 66 126 117 75 13 179    
Surprise < 0 707 96 158 136 118 22 232    
Ratio (+/-) 0.70 0.69 0.80 0.86 0.64 0.55 0.77    
N 446 162 284 253 193 35 411    
           
CAR (in %) 1.1577*** 1.0682*** 1.1927*** 1.1070*** 1.2408*** 0.4958 1.2203*** -0.1245 -0.1338 -0.7245 
CAR > 0 328 106 221 205 123 26 302    
CAR < 0 216 76 140 133 83 21 195    
Ratio (+/-) 1.52 1.39 1.58 1.54 1.48 1.24 1.55    




Table 14: Multivariate regression results for earnings surprises and CARs based on specific family firm characteristics 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) for the sample of 195 firms from January 
2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the Surprise in columns 1–3 and the CAR in columns 4–6. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are 
included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the dummies for family firms at the founder and descendant stages in columns 1 and 4, the active and non-active family 
dummies in columns 2 and 5, and dummies for family firms with founder CEO and without founder CEO in columns 3 and 6. All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses.  
 Surprise CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family at founder stage 0.4564   0.6712**   
 (0.649)   (0.290)   
Family at descendant stage 0.7319**   0.8111**   
 (0.352)   (0.369)   
Family active  0.7901**   0.7433*  
  (0.357)   (0.424)  
Family non-active  0.4312   0.7888***  
  (0.539)   (0.264)  
Family with founder CEO   0.1596   0.3688 
   (0.794)   (0.581) 
Family without founder CEO   0.6767*   0.7914** 
   (0.353)   (0.321) 
Analyst coverage -0.1359** -0.1336** -0.1359** -0.0257 -0.0259 -0.0259 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
logSize (lagged) 1.1156*** 1.1154*** 1.1143*** -0.1970 -0.1953 -0.1974 
 (0.348) (0.355) (0.346) (0.256) (0.255) (0.254) 
logBM (lagged) -0.0942 -0.0827 -0.1001 0.1039 0.1059 0.0996 
 (0.666) (0.668) (0.664) (0.256) (0.258) (0.253) 
Intercept -24.7785*** -24.8644*** -24.7565*** 5.0304** 5.0080** 5.0423** 
 (4.939) (4.920) (4.811) (1.990) (2.000) (1.960) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Methods POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C 
N 1182 1182 1182 1201 1201 1201 
 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions and sources 
This table defines the variables used in the analysis. The data for the ownership structure are obtained from the database of Isakov and 
Weisskopf (2014) and updated by hand-collecting data from annual reports and from the Swiss stock guides. Firm characteristics and 
market data are mainly from Datastream and Worldscope, while those on earnings announcements are from FactSet. The period of 
analysis is from January 2003 to December 2013. 
Firm ownership measure 
Widely held firm (WH) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if no shareholder holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (FF) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a family holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family control rights The percentage of voting rights held by the largest shareholder in a family firm. 
Family firms at the founder 
stage (FFF) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a family firm is held by its founder, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms at the 
descendant stage (FFD) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a family firm is held by its descendant, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Family active (FA) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if at least one member of the family is active in the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Family non-active (FNA) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if no member of the family is active in the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms with founder 
CEO 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is the founder of the family 
firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms without 
founder CEO 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is not the founder of the 
family firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (Stake 20–50) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 20% and 50% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (Stake 50–80) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 50% and 80% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (Stake 80–
100) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 80% and 
100% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Other blockholder (OB) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a shareholder with more than 20% of the voting rights but is not family, and 0 otherwise. 
State (S) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the state holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Private investor (PI) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a private investor holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely held corporation 
(WHC) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if another widely held corporation holds 
more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely held financial 
(WHF) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if another widely held financial firm 
holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 




Age The age of a firm in years computed as the current year minus the year of foundation stated in the Swiss stock guides. 
Amihud's illiquidity ratio 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) is calculated using daily data 
and is then averaged by month. The daily ratio is calculated by dividing the 
daily return by the daily trading volume, which is calculated by multiplying the 
daily price by the daily volume. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Asset growth (AG) The asset growth of a firm over the past year and the past five years (AG_1year, AG_5years). Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Beta Regression coefficients of the market model calculated using the returns of the previous 60 months. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Book-to-market (BM) Ratio of the book value to the market value of common equity. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Dividend yield (DY) The ratio of total dividends to total market capitalization. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Leverage (Lev) Long-term debt divided by total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
logBM The natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
logSize The natural logarithm of the firm’s market value. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Market value Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. Data are obtained from Datastream and expressed in million CHF. 
Net sales Gross sales and other operating revenue except discounts, returns, and allowances. Data are obtained from Worldscope and expressed in million CHF. 
Operating margin (OM) Operating income over net sales. Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Price The closing price at which the firm’s stock is traded. Data are obtained from Datastream and expressed in CHF. 
Return_2_3 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns over months t - 2 and t - 3. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return_4_6 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns from month t - 6 to t - 4. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return_7_12 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns from month t - 12 to t - 7. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return-on-assets (ROA) Income before extraordinary items (IBEI) divided by the total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Return-on-equity (ROE) Net income divided by the book value on equity. Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Sales growth The sales growth of a firm over the past year and the past five years (SG_1year, SG_5years). Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Sales to total assets Net sales divided by total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Total assets 
Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment, and other assets. Data are obtained from Datastream and expressed 
in million CHF. 
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Volatility The monthly volatility of a stock calculated using daily data and averaged by month. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Wedge Ratio between the number of voting and of cash-flow rights. Data are obtained from annual reports and the Swiss stock guides. 
 
Earnings announcements 
Analyst coverage The number of analysts issuing nine-month horizon earnings per share estimates for a particular firm and year. Data are obtained from FactSet. 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) 
The CAR is computed from an event study (with the market model as normal 
return) over the window [-1; +1]. Data are obtained from Datastream and 
FactSet. 
Surprise 
The actual earnings per share at the end of the fiscal year minus the estimated 
earnings forecasted nine months prior, deflated by the share price at the time 




Monthly returns of the securities calculated from the monthly stock prices 
collected at the end of each month and adjusted to the dividend distribution. 
Data are obtained from Datastream. 
RFt 
The risk-free rate in month t is the three-month ICE Libor for CHF. Data are 
obtained from Datastream. 
RMRFt 
The expected market return minus the risk-free rate (RF) in month t. Data are 
obtained from Ammann and Steiner (2008) website. 
SMBt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of small-
cap stocks and that of a portfolio of large cap stocks. Data are obtained from 
Ammann and Steiner (2008) website. 
HMLt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of stocks 
with high book-to-market and that of a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-
market. Data are obtained from Ammann and Steiner (2008) website. 
WMLt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio with 
stocks having outperformed the previous month and that of a portfolio with 
stocks having underperformed in the previous month. Data are obtained from 
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